Online research in philosophy

Three experiments are reported in which the relationships between task format, item type, and strategy usage were investigated for a two-dimensional relational inference task. Contrary to past findings with linear syllogisms, it was found that parallel presentation (presenting problem statements simultaneously) did not result in any increased use of deduction rule processes compared with serial presentation (presenting problem statements individually). Instead, the results suggested that mental models were used by the majority of subjects, and that multiple models were more likely to be constructed with parallel presentation. It is proposed that, in general, multiple model construction will be more frequent for deduction tasks where the cognitive load is relatively low. Hence, contrary to suggestions by Polk and Newell (1995), reasoning in this way appears to be prevalent and highly robust - where supported by task format - even where the use of this strategy is disadvantageous.

Researchers currently working on relational reasoning typically argue that mental model theory (MMT) is a better account than the inference rule approach (IRA). They predict and observe that determinate (or one-model) problems are easier than indeterminate (or two-model) problems, whereas according to them, IRA should lead to the opposite prediction. However, the predictions attributed to IRA are based on a mistaken argument. The IRA is generally presented in such a way that inference rules only deal with determinate relations and not with indeterminate ones. However, (a) there is no reason to presuppose that a rule-based procedure could not deal with indeterminate relations, and (b) applying a rule-based procedure to indeterminate relations should result in greater difficulty. Hence, none of the recent articles devoted to relational reasoning currently presents a conclusive case for discarding IRA by using the well-known determinate vs indeterminate problems comparison.

In this paper we deal with two types of reasoning: induction, and deduction First, we present a unified computational model of deductive reasoning through models, where deduction occurs in five phases: Construction, Integration, Conclusion, Falsification, and Response. Second, we make an attempt, to analyze induction through the same phases. Our aim is an explorative evaluation of the mental processes possibly shared by deductive and inductive reasoning.

The ability to reason independently from one's own goals or beliefs has long been recognised as a key characteristic of the development of formal operational thought. In this article we present the results of a study that examined the correlates of this ability in a group of 10-year-old children ( N  = 61). Participants were presented with conditional and relational reasoning items, where the content was manipulated such that the conclusion to the arguments were either congruent, neutral, or incongruent with beliefs, and either logically valid or logically invalid. Participants also received a measure of working memory capacity (the counting span task) and a measure of inhibitory control (the stop signal task). Indices of belief bias and logical reasoning on belief-based problems were predicted independently by both measures. In contrast logical reasoning on belief neutral problems was predicted by working memory alone. The findings suggest that executive functions play a key role in the development of children's ability to decontextualise their thinking.

Current conceptions of the nature of human reasoning make it no longer tenable to assess children's inference by reference to the norms of logical inference. Alternatively, the complexity of the mental models employed in children's inferences can be analysed. This approach is applied to transitive inference, class inclusion, categorical induction, theory of mind, oddity, categorical syllogisms, analogy, and reasoning deficits. It is argued that a coherent account of children's reasoning emerges in that there is correspondence between tasks at the same level of complexity across different domains, and that the inferences of younger children, while impressive and important, are consistently simpler than those of older children.

Johnson-Laird (1983) has argued that spatial reasoning is based on the construction and manipulation of mental models in memory. The present article addresses the question of whether reasoning about time relations is constrained by the same factors as reasoning about spatial relations. An experiment is reported that explored the similarities and the differences in the performance of subjects in comparable spatial and temporal reasoning tasks. The results indicated that, in both the temporal and the spatial content domains, the data were in agreement with the view that subjects solved problems by constructing models in memory rather than with a logical rule conceptualisation of reasoning. An analysis of the premise-reading times on the basis of premise-linking order provided support for an on-line process of mental models construction, and offered an explanation for the finding that spatial problems that did require an inference of transitivity were easier than problems that did not. No essential differences in processing and performance were observed across the two content domains, although in the time domain the correctness data were in agreement with both the mental models theory and the logical rules view. The results are discussed with respect to the mental models theory and the structural characteristics of the problems.

The mental model theory predicts variations in the percentage of errors in meta-propositional reasoning tasks but does not specify the nature of these errors (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1990). In the present study, we drew predictions concerning the nature of errors in a meta-propositional reasoning task by importing and elaborating the distinction between implicit and explicit models previously applied by the mental model theory to the domain of propositional reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). An experiment was conducted in which participants were asked to solve problems concerning the truth or falsity of propositional assertions. The task was to determine the truth-status (liar or truth-teller) of two persons making a propositional assertion about their own truth-status and/or the truth-status of the other person. The results were consistent with the hypothesis that people may reason in ways that differ in the extent to which initially implicit models are made explicit. As such, the results corroborate a basic principle of the mental model theory: the errors that reasoners make are consistent with at least one of the mental models they construct during the process of reasoning.

Reasoning requires making inferences based on information gleaned from a set of relations. The relational complexity of a problem increases with the number of relations that must be considered simultaneously to make a correct inference. Previous work (Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, & Knowlton, 2004) has shown that older adults have difficulty integrating multiple relations during analogical reasoning, especially when required to inhibit irrelevant information. We report two experiments that examined the ability to integrate multiple relations in younger, middle-aged, and older adults performing two other reasoning tasks. These tasks systematically varied relational complexity, and required either inductive reasoning (a version of the Raven's Matrices Task) or transitive inference. Our results show that as people age they have increasing difficulty in solving problems that require them to integrate multiple relations. This difficulty may stem from a decrease in working memory capacity.

Johnson-Laird's mental models theory claims that reasoning is a semantic process of construction and manipulation of models in working memory of limited capacity. Accordingly, both a deduction and a given interpretation of a premise would be all the harder the higher the number of models they require. The purpose of the present experiment was twofold. First, it aimed to demonstrate that the interpretation of if...then conditional sentences in children (third, sixth, and ninth graders) evolves as a function of the number of models the children can produce. We proposed a theory of conditional reasoning development that hypothesises a developmental trend of three successive levels of interpretations underlain by one, two, and then three models, i.e. conjunctive, biconditional, and conditional respectively. Second, we aimed to show that these different levels correlate with working memory capacities: the higher the working memory span, the higher the number of models underlying the conditional interpretation. These two hypotheses were verified, supporting the mental models theory. The results are compared with the rival theory of mental logic.

Mental model theory has been used to explain many differing phenomena in adult reasoning, including the extensively studied case of conditional reasoning. However, the current theory makes predictions about the development of conditional reasoning that are not consistent with data. In this article, young children's performance on conditional reasoning problems and the justifications given are analysed. A mental model account of conditional reasoning is proposed that assumes that (1) young children can reason with two models and (2) the fleshing out of conditionals involves activation of information in semantic memory that uses the minor premise as a retrieval cue.