Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219 (2009)
Abstract
This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents
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Miriam McCormick (2011). Taking Control of Belief. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169 - 183.
Eleonora Cresto (2012). A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.
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