Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219 (2009)
This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790902838522
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA
Miriam McCormick (2011). Taking Control of Belief. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169 - 183.
Pascal Engel (2013). Is Epistemic Agency Possible? Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.
Eleonora Cresto (2012). A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.

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