Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59 (2008)
|Abstract||The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to me, however, that a number of these criticisms are based on a number of misunderstandings of the notion of a norm and of the way it can regulated a given practice. Once we spell out in what sense knowledge can play a normative role in this context, the KAA appears much more plausible.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
J. Carter & Emma Gordon (2011). Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
Steven L. Reynolds (forthcoming). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
Adam Leite (2007). How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen de Ridder (2012). Unsafe Assertions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):1-5.
Conor McHugh (2010). What Assertion Doesn't Show. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
Rhys McKinnon (2012). How Do You Know That 'How Do You Know?' Challenges a Speaker's Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83.
Matthew A. Benton (2011). Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 71 (4):684-687.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads121 ( #4,152 of 549,069 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,186 of 549,069 )
How can I increase my downloads?