David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Topoi 29 (2):147-151 (2010)
This essay argues that propositions are made true by facts. A proposition is the sense expressed by a statement (sentence token used to make a truth claim). Facts are positive or negative constitutive properties of the domain of discourse (usually the actual world). The presence of horses is a positive constitutive property of the world; the absence of unicorns is a negative one. This notion of constitutive properties accords well with the Hume-Kant claim that existence is not a property of any individual said to exist. While Frege held existence to be a property of concepts and Russell held it to be a property of propositional functions, our view sees existence as a property of a domain of discourse. To say that Native Dancer exists is simply to say that the world is characterized by the presence of Native Dancer; to say that Pegasus does not exist is to say the world is characterized by the absence of Pegasus. Such properties of presence and absence are facts. Facts make true propositions true; nothing makes false propositions false (they simply fail to be made true). Facts are not items in the world; they are (constitutive) properties of the world.
|Keywords||Constituents Domains Existence Fact Properties Sense Truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1984). `On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In , Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 183-198.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christine Tappolet (2011). Truth as One and Many, by Michael P. Lynch. Mind 119 (476):1193-1198.
Douglas Edwards (2012). On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2007). The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 61--89.
D. Goldstick (2000). Correspondence. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 (2):195 - 197.
Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
Scott Soames (2011). True At. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):124 - 133.
Gunnar Björnsson, If You Believe in Positive Facts, You Should Believe in Negative Facts. Hommage À Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
Robin Stenwall (2010). Causal Truthmaking. Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
Added to index2010-01-13
Total downloads52 ( #37,734 of 1,679,399 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #59,947 of 1,679,399 )
How can I increase my downloads?