Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency

Abstract
Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
Tyler Burge (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:91-116.
Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.

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