David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610 (2010)
Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Science Developmental Psychology Epistemology Neurosciences Cognitive Psychology Philosophy of Mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Christopher Peacocke (1999). Being Known. Oxford University Press.
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