The false modesty of the identity theory of truth
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458 (2001)
| Abstract | The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name. | |||||||||
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