The norms of thought: Are they social?

Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148 (2002)
A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social
Keywords Mental Content  Metaphysics  Norm  Social  Thought
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DOI 10.1007/BF02512078
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Matteo Mameli (2006). Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (1):101-121.

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