David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148 (2002)
A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgensteinâs rule following considerations, Davidsonâs triangulation argument, and Brandomâs inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social
|Keywords||Mental Content Metaphysics Norm Social Thought|
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Matteo Mameli (2006). Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (1):101-121.
Matteo Mameli (2006). Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):101-121.
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