Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):265-281 (2002)
|Abstract||This paper attempts to clarify some issues about what is usually called “doxastic voluntarism”. This phrase often hides a confusion between two separate (although connected) issues: whether beliefis or can be, as a matter of psychological fact, under the control of the will, on the one hand, and whether we can have practical reasons to believe something, or whether our beliefs are subject to any sort of “ought”, on the other hand. The first issue -- which I prefer to call the issue of volitionism about belief -- is psychological, and I take the answer to be negative, along the lines of the conceptual arguments against believing at will adduced by writers such as Bernard Williams. The second issue -- which I call voluntarism proper -- is normative, and the answer that I give is a qualified yes. Belief is not a matter of the will, although there are certain things that we ought to believe|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Danny Frederick (2013). Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Michael J. Shaffer (2013). Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening Commitments. American Philosophical Quarterly 50:73-82.
Rico Vitz, Doxastic Voluntarism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Leaps of Knowledge. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. OUP.
Rico Vitz (2010). Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:107-21.
Robert Audi (2008). The Ethics of Belief: Doxastic Self-Control and Intellectual Virtue. Synthese 161 (3):403 - 418.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2006). Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation. South African Journal of Philosophy 25:171-176.
Matthias Steup (2011). Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality. Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
Nathan Segars (2006). The Will and Evidence Toward Belief: A Critical Essay on Jonathan E. Adler's Belief's Own Ethics. Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.
James Montmarquet (2008). Virtue and Voluntarism. Synthese 161 (3):393 - 402.
Nikolaj Nottelmann (2006). The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559 - 582.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads5 ( #160,204 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?