Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action

Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198 (2006)
There is a fairly widespread—and very infl uential—hope among philosophers interested in the status of normativity that the solution to our metaethical and, more generally, metanormative problems will emerge from the philosophy of action. In this essay, I will argue that these hopes are groundless. I will focus on the metanormative hope, but—as will become clear—showing that the solution to our metanormative problems will not come from what is constitutive of action will also devastate the hope of gaining significant insight into first-order, normative truths by focusing (only) on what is constitutive of action.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-115-2-169
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