Giving Practical Reasons

Philosophers' Imprint 11 (4) (2011)
I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And how is it that we can do it? In this paper, I characterize what I call robust reason giving, the kind present in requests. I distinguish it from epistemic and merely triggering reason-giving, I discuss in detail the phenomenology of robust reason-giving, and I offer an analysis of robust reason-giving in terms of the complex intentions of the reason-giver and of the normative background
Keywords Requests  Reason-giving  Normative Powers
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David Enoch (2014). Authority and Reason‐Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
Benjamin McMyler (2015). Requesting Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Paul Faulkner (2014). The Moral Obligations of Trust. Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):332-345.

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David Enoch (2011). Reason-Giving and the Law. In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press
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Derek Parfit (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
David Enoch (2014). Authority and Reason‐Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.

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