David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15 - 50 (2009)
Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism.
|Keywords||The argument from relativity Disagreement Objectivity Moral realism|
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References found in this work BETA
Robin Attfield (1979). How Not to Be a Moral Relativist. The Monist 62 (4):510-523.
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
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Simon Blackburn (1981). Reply : Rule-Following and Moral Realism. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Routledge. 163--87.
Citations of this work BETA
David Enoch (2010). The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):413 - 438.
Amir Konigsberg (2012). The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement. Theoria 79 (1):96-126.
Christopher Cowie (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.
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