|Abstract||Let me start with a confession: I suspect that as a psychological matter, I hold the metaethical view I in fact hold not because of highly abstract arguments in the philosophy of language, say, or in the philosophy of action, or because of some general ontological commitments. My underlying motivations for holding the metaethical view I in fact hold are—to the extent that they are transparent to me—much less abstract, and perhaps even much less philosophical. Like many other realists (I suspect), I pretheoretically feel that nothing short of a fairly strong metaethical realism will vindicate our taking morality—or perhaps normativity more generally—seriously. Elsewhere I develop an argument for my favorite kind of realism—the one I call Robust Realism—that is an attempt to ﬂesh out the details of one member of this taking-morality-seriously family.¹ Here I want to develop an argument that is another member of this family. The intuitive idea my argument here will attempt to explicate is rather simple: Metaethical positions that are not objectivist in some important, intuitive sense have—in the context of interpersonal disagreement and conﬂict—implications that are objectionable on ﬁrst-order, moral grounds, and should therefore be rejected. The idea, then, is not to look into the..|
|Keywords||Moral Objectivity Neutrality of Metaethics Impartiality|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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