Moral luck and the law

Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54 (2010)
Abstract
Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be related to that of moral luck.
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    Darren Domsky (2004). There Is No Door. Journal of Philosophy 101 (9):445 - 464.

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