Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181 (1994)
|Abstract||The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind-body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind from instrumentalism and computational functionalism, and examine Gestalt attributions of meaning and value to perceived objects. Finally, we consider a metatheoretical moral from Gestalt theory, which commends the search for commensurate description of mental phenomena and their physiological counterparts.|
|Keywords||Gestalt Metaphysics Mind Morality Psychology|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Max Wertheimer (1944). Gestalt Theory. In Willis D. Ellis (ed.), Source Book of Gestalt Psychology. Harcourt, Brace and Co.
Eva Ruhnau (1995). Time Gestalt and the Observer. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand SchÃ¶ningh.
Reinhardt S. Grossman (1977). Structures Versus Sets: The Philosophical Background of Gestalt Psychology. Critica 9 (December):3-21.
Thomas H. Leahey (2003). Gestalt Psychology. In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
William D. Woody (1999). William James and Gestalt Psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):79-92.
Fredrik Sundqvist (2003). Perceptual Dynamics: Theoretical Foundations and Philosophical Implications of Gestalt Psychology (Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensia 16). GÃ¶teborg: Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensia.
Gaetano Kanizsa (1994). Gestalt Theory has Been Misinterpreted, but has Had Some Real Conceptual Difficulties. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):149-162.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #18,340 of 549,766 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,766 )
How can I increase my downloads?