Gestalt psychology and the philosophy of mind

Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181 (1994)
The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind-body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind from instrumentalism and computational functionalism, and examine Gestalt attributions of meaning and value to perceived objects. Finally, we consider a metatheoretical moral from Gestalt theory, which commends the search for commensurate description of mental phenomena and their physiological counterparts.
Keywords Gestalt  Metaphysics  Mind  Morality  Psychology
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DOI 10.1080/09515089408573118
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Gary Hatfield (2012). Koffka, Köhler, and the “Crisis” in Psychology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (2):483-492.

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