Analysis 72 (3):474-478 (2012)
|Abstract||In a recent article, Harold Noonan argues that application conditions and criteria of identity are not distinct from one another. This seems to threaten the standard approach to distinguishing sortals from adjectival terms. I propose that his observation, while correct, does not have this consequence. I present a simple scheme for distinguishing sortals from adjectival terms. I also propose an amended version of the standard canonical form of criteria of identity|
|Keywords||sortals identity properties|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John E. Sarnecki (2008). Sortals for Dummies. Erkenntnis 69 (2):145 - 164.
Max A. Freund (2000). A Complete and Consistent Formal System for Sortals. Studia Logica 65 (3):367-381.
Max A. Freund (2001). A Temporal Logic for Sortals. Studia Logica 69 (3):351-380.
Bert Baumgaertner (2012). Vagueness Intuitions and the Mobility of Cognitive Sortals. Minds and Machines 22 (3):213-234.
John Campbell (2006). Sortals and the Binding Problem. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.
Aleksandar Kellenberg (2009). Identifying Criteria of Identity. Metaphysica 10 (1):109-122.
Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):61-68.
Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). Review of 'More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms'. By E. J. LOWE. [REVIEW] Mind.
P. Garbacz (2004). Subsumption and Relative Identity. Axiomathes 14 (4):341-360.
Alan Sidelle (1995). A Semantic Account of Rigidity. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):69 - 105.
David V. Ward (1984). Identity. Philosophy Research Archives 10:353-382.
Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
Anne Newstead (2003). Singling Out Objects Without Sortals. In Slezak Peter (ed.), International Conference on Cognitive Science (ICCS).
Michael Bradie (1983). Recent Work on Criteria for Event Identity, 1967-1979. Philosophy Research Archives 9:29-77.
Added to index2012-06-02
Total downloads40 ( #28,872 of 549,084 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,333 of 549,084 )
How can I increase my downloads?