Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872 (2012)
|Abstract||Two prevailing accounts of the structure of the mind have been provided, respectively, by the Dual System Theory and by the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. It has been claimed, however, that they cannot both be true at the same time, i.e., that they are incompatible and, thus, that one of them must be abandoned. I will offer some arguments to challenge this claim. I will show that a plausible understanding of each theory makes it possible for them both to be true at the same time. Moreover, I will argue that by appealing to each other they can offer a more complete and detailed account of the architecture of the mind|
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