Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 190 (5):809-830 (2013)
|Abstract||The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not coincide with her degree of belief in a conditional that A would be the case if she were to bet on A, where the belief in this conditional itself is conditioned on the supposition that the agent will have an opportunity to make such a bet. Even though the two degrees of belief sometimes can coincide (they will coincide in those cases when the bet has no expected causal bearings on the proposition A and the opportunity to bet have no evidential bearings on that proposition), it is the latter belief rather than the former that guides the agent’s rational betting behaviour. The reason is that this latter belief takes into consideration potential interferences that bet opportunities and betting itself might create with regard to the proposition to be betted on. It is because of this interference problem that the agent’s degree of belief in A cannot be interpreted as her betting rate for A|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument. Studia Logica 87 (1):65 - 71.
Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Peter Milne (1990). Scotching the Dutch Book Argument. Erkenntnis 32 (1):105--26.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
Glenn Shafer (2010). A Betting Interpretation for Probabilities and Dempster-Shafer Degrees of Belief. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning.
T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517 - 524.
Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Peter Milne (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.
Julia Staffel (2013). Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
Jon Williamson (forthcoming). From Bayesianism to the Epistemic View of Mathematics†. Philosophia Mathematica.
Frank Plumpton Ramsey & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (1980). Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey. Cambridge University Press.
James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe (2012). Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference. Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.
Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
Added to index2012-10-04
Total downloads8 ( #131,816 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,322 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?