Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this paper, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist approach to causation, our understanding of physicalism has to change, and this leads to what I call pluralistic physicalism. Secondly, I show that this pluralistic physicalism is not endangered by the causal exclusion argument.
Keywords Explanatory pluralism  Physicalism  Pluralistic physicalism  Causal exclusion  Interventionism  Robustness
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0041-7
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Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2014). Interventionism and Higher-Level Causation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):49-64.
Jeff Engelhardt (2015). What is the Exclusion Problem? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):205-232.

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