Reductionist Challenges to Explanatory Pluralism: Comment on McCauley
Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):637-646 (2009)
| Abstract | In this comment, I first point out some problems in McCauley's defense of the traditional conception of general analytical levels. Then I present certain reductionist arguments against explanatory pluralism that are not based on the New Wave model of intertheoretic reduction, against which McCauley is arguing. Reductionists that are not committed to this model might not have problems incorporating research on long-term diachronic processes in their analyses. In the last part of the paper, I briefly compare Robert N. McCauley's conception of reduction to some other current accounts, highlighting the differences between them | |||||||||
| Keywords | Explanatory Pluralism Reduction Levels | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesPeter Lipton (2008). CP Laws, Reduction, and Explanatory Pluralism. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
Ingo Brigandt (2013). Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims. Science and Education 22:69-91.
Robert N. McCauley (2009). Time is of the Essence: Explanatory Pluralism and Accommodating Theories About Long-Term Processes. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):611-635.
Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):33-46.
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