David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations (1995)
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of meaning introduced by Jon Barwise and John Perry. It has evoked great theoretical interest and motivated the framework of a few `computational' systems. PROSIT is the pioneering work in this direction. Unfortunately, there is a lack of real-life applications on these systems and this study is a preliminary attempt to remedy this deficiency. Here, we solve a group of epistemic puzzles using the constructs provided by PROSIT.
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