Causal properties and conservative reduction

The paper argues in favour of a causal-functional theory of all properties including the physical ones and a conception of properties as tropes or modes in the sense of particular ways that objects are. It shows how these premises open up a version of functionalism according to which the properties on which the special sciences focus are identical with configurations of physical properties and thereby causally efficacious without there being any threat of eliminativism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3196/003180211796334165
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Cei Maslen (2008). A Higher-Order Problem of Causal Relevance? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:149-157.
Warren Shrader (2010). Shoemaker on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):285 - 300.
Ann Whittle (2009). Causal Nominalism. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;
Paul Noordhof (1997). Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
Peter Menzies & Christian List (2010). The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences. In Cynthia Mcdonald & Graham Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

52 ( #65,834 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #61,095 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.