How a Social Theory of Meaning can be connected with Realism

Facta Philosophica 4:111-131 (2001)
Abstract
Contrary to what is claimed in the literature, a social theory of meaning is committed neither to a social relativism, nor does it have any sort of an idealistic implication. Such a theory of meaning can be seen as being about our epistemic access to a world that is causally and ontologically independent of the social practices which determine meaning. If these social practices are conceived in terms of open-ended I-thou relations between individuals, we avoid any reduction of what is correct in our thoughts about the world to social facts. We are committed to a sort of response-dependence of our concepts, but one which does not infringe upon realism. The upshot is a pragmatic realism: pragmatic, because the meaning of our thoughts is determined by social practices; a realism, because whether or not our thoughts about the world are true supervenes on the way the world is
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,047
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Susan Haack (1987). Realism. Synthese 73 (2):275 - 299.
Patricia Hanna (2008). Realism Without Empiricism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17:65-73.
Henry Jackman (1998). Individualism and Interpretation. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):31-38.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-12-22

Total downloads

9 ( #165,488 of 1,101,746 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #191,891 of 1,101,746 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.