David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):199-213 (2007)
The paper argues that metaphysics depends upon science when it comes to claims about the constitution of the real world. That thesis is illustrated by considering the examples of global supervenience, the tenseless vs. the tensed theory of time and existence, events vs. substances, and relations vs. intrinsic properties. An argument is sketched out for a metaphysics of a four-dimensional block universe whose content are events and their sequences, events consisting in physical properties instantiated at space-time points, these properties being relations rather than intrinsic properties.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Esfeld (2006). The Impact of Science on Metaphysics and its Limits. Abstracta 2 (2):86-101.
Katherine Hawley (2006). Science as a Guide to Metaphysics? Synthese 149 (3):451 - 470.
Alyssa Ney (2007). Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60.
Michael Esfeld (2003). Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties? A Physical Argument for a Metaphysics of Relations. Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 4 (1):5-25.
Michael Esfeld (2006). From Being Ontologically Serious to Serious Ontology. In , John Heil: Symposium on His Ontological Point of View. Ontos. 191--206.
Michael Esfeld (2004). Quantum Entanglement and a Metaphysics of Relations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 35 (4):601-617.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #34,758 of 1,139,956 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #39,742 of 1,139,956 )
How can I increase my downloads?