|Abstract||The paper spells out five different accounts of the relationship between objects and relations three of which are versions of ontic structural realism (OSR). We argue that the distinction between objects and properties, including relations, is merely a conceptual one by contrast to an ontological one: properties, including relations, are modes, that is the concrete, particular ways in which objects exist. We then set out moderate OSR as the view according to which irreducible relations are central ways in which the fundamental physical objects exist. Physical structures thus consist in objects for whom it is essential that they are related in certain ways. There hence are objects, but they do not possess an intrinsic identity. This view can also admit intrinsic properties as ways in which objects exist provided that these do not amount to identity conditions for the objects. Finally, we indicate how this view can take objective modality into account.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Vincent Lam & Michael Esfeld (2012). The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (2):243-258.
J. Wolff (2012). Do Objects Depend on Structures? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):607-625.
Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam (2006). Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time. Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
Antigone M. Nounou (forthcoming). Kinds of Objects and Varieties of Properties. In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structures, Objects and Causality. Springer.
Luciano Floridi (2007). A Defence of Informational Structural Realism. Synthese 161 (2):219 - 253.
Anjan Chakravartty, Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.
Michael Esfeld (2009). The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
Benjamin C. Jantzen (2011). No Two Entities Without Identity. Synthese 181 (3):433-450.
By Crawford L. Elder (2006). Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1–15.
Added to index2010-09-10
Total downloads98 ( #6,418 of 549,011 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #5,394 of 549,011 )
How can I increase my downloads?