Pragmatic Interpretation of Belief Systems in Hume and Peirce

Cinta de Moebio 50:101-110 (2014)
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Abstract

In philosophical literature the issue of beliefs has been identified historically with David Hume and common sense. Beliefs are dynamic systems and its resignification is constant. Charles Sanders Pierce would interpret the fixation of beliefs, as those ones which are fixed by means of art, being this a method well-tuned with science. Truths established in beliefs are always probable and dependent on the degree of utility they have. The degree of utility is complemented with comprehension, explanations have multiple causes. En la literatura filosófica el tema de las creencias se puede identificar históricamente con David Hume y el sentido común. Las creencias son sistemas dinámicos y su resignificación es constante. Charles Sanders Peirce interpretaría la fijación de las creencias en Hume, como aquella que se fija a través del arte, siendo ésta un método que se acomoda bien con el de la ciencia. Las verdades establecidas en las creencias son siempre probables y dependen del grado de utilidad que ellas presten. El grado de utilidad se complementa con la comprensión, las explicaciones son multicausales

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An enquiry concerning human understanding.David Hume - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 112.

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