David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):109-121 (2011)
The seminal contribution of Sen led to a new way to conceptualize and measure absolute poverty, by arguing for the need to ‘take note of the inequality among the poor’ . Since then, the ‘Inequality’ of poverty has become the third ‘I’ of poverty, which together with the ‘Incidence’ and the ‘Intensity’ of it constitute the dimensions deemed relevant for poverty evaluation. In this paper, we first argue that the interest in the third ‘I’ of poverty actually originates from a prioritarian rather than an egalitarian attitude. Further, we illustrate the inability of the three ‘I's to fully comprise the criteria for the assessment of poverty which are de facto adopted by existing poverty indices. Some of them resolve distributional conflicts by following leximin, hence assigning a pivotal role to the worst off. We question the desirability of leximin, and conclude that giving absolute priority to the worst off is plausible only in cases where the latter has been identified by an exogenous threshold demarcating a significant difference in human suffering. Finally, we explore to what extent prioritarianism and the sufficiency argument of Frankfurt , Crisp and Casal can help conceptualize giving absolute priority to individuals or groups indentified by exogenous thresholds
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References found in this work BETA
Paula Casal (2007). Why Sufficiency is Not Enough. Ethics 117 (2):296-326.
Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics 113 (4):745-763.
Harry Frankfurt (1987). Equality as a Moral Ideal. Ethics 98 (1):21-43.
Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
Bertil Tungodden (2003). The Value of Equality. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):1-44.
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