David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139 (2008)
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense. The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’.
|Keywords||Value relations Incomparability Small improvement argument Vagueness|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Joseph Raz (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press.
Leonard J. Savage (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Kit Fine (1975). Vagueness, Truth and Logic. Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Citations of this work BETA
Justin Klocksiem (2010). In Defense of the Trichotomy Thesis. Acta Analytica 25 (3):317-327.
Martin Peterson & Barbro Fröding (2012). Virtuous Choice and Parity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):71-82.
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