Reply to Copp, Gaus, Richardson, and Edmundson

Ethics 121 (2):354-389 (2011)
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Abstract

This piece is a response to four essays that critically discuss my book Democratic Authority. In addition to responding to their specific criticisms, it takes up several methodological issues that put some of the critiques in a broader context. Among the issues discussed are “normative consent,” which I offer as a new theory of authority; the “general acceptability requirement,” which advances a broadly Rawlsian approach to political justification; and methodological questions about theory building, including a device I dub the “method of provisional leap.”

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Author's Profile

David Estlund
Brown University

Citations of this work

Against Normative Consent.Nicolas Frank - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):470-487.
The ideal and reality of epistemic proceduralism.James Gledhill - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
The ideal and reality of epistemic proceduralism.James Gledhill - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (4):486-507.

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References found in this work

Consent and Its Cousins.William A. Edmundson - 2011 - Ethics 121 (2):335-53.

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