The problem of noncounterfactual conditionals

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688 (2009)
Abstract
I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, Belgium; e‐mail: etlin@alum.mit.edu.
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DOI 10.1086/605798
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