Philosophy of Science 76 (5) (2009)
|Abstract||I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, Belgium; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel Rothschild (2013). Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions? Noûs 47 (1):49-68.
Malte Willer (2010). New Surprises for the Ramsey Test. Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.
André Fuhrmann & Isaac Levi (1994). Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. Synthese 101 (2):157 - 169.
G. Crocco, Luis Fariñas del Cerro & Andreas Herzig (eds.) (1995). Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Craig Boutilier (1996). Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 91 (3):195 - 237.
Added to index2010-02-17
Total downloads43 ( #30,760 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?