David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 31 (3):243-268 (2012)
The case law surrounding surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, genetic donation, and legal parenthood is notoriously confused. Yet the issues involved in these cases are of fundamental importance to our most basic rights. To make matters worse, ongoing developments in technology continue to push the conceptual limits of both our legal and moral schemes. In this paper I argue that the concept of ‘parenthood’ is deeply ambiguous and attempt to carefully untangle the notion into two distinct concepts – one biological and largely descriptive, and the other social and profoundly normative. I argue that the social notion of parenthood is a complex function of intentions, actions, and emotional states. It is a concept both defined and constrained by social norms. The biological notion of parenthood, for its part, cannot be understood in strictly genetic terms. I offer, instead, a more fleshed out view that treats biological parenthood as a family resemblance concept. Finally, I discuss the role of gestation in the context of a powerful feminist critique and argue that although gestation is a biological phenomenon, it is a mistake to think that its relevance is limited to biology. In fact, what is special about gestation, in the context of parenthood and obligation, is its distinctly social role. By shifting the discussion of gestation away from biology and toward the realm of the social, we can make better sense of the disputes that manifest themselves in the literature and in the law
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Susan Feldman (1992). Multiple Biological Mothers: The Case for Gestation. Journal of Social Philosophy 23 (1):98-104.
Margaret Olivia Little (1999). Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):295-312.
Liezl van Zyl (2002). Intentional Parenthood and the Nuclear Family. Journal of Medical Humanities 23 (2):107-118.
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (2003). Biological Explanations and Social Responsibility. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (2):345-358.
Joseph Millum (2010). How Do We Acquire Parental Rights? Social Theory and Practice 36 (1):112-132.
Kenneth Einar Himma (2013). The Ties That Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation. Ratio Juris 26 (1):16-46.
David Archard (2012). The Future of the Family. Ethics and Social Welfare 6 (2):132-142.
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (2003). When Is Biology Destiny? Biological Determinism and Social Responsibility. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1184-1194.
Justin Weinberg (2009). Norms and the Agency of Justice. Analyse & Kritik 31 (2):319-338.
M. Baurmann (2000). Legal Authority as a Social Fact. Law and Philosophy 19 (2):247-262.
Brenda Almond (2012). Kantian Voices in the Family Values Debate. Ethics and Social Welfare 6 (2):143-156.
Liezl van Zyl (2002). Intentional Parenthood: Responsibilities in Surrogate Motherhood. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 10 (2):165-175.
Inmaculada de Melo‐Martín (2003). When is Biology Destiny? Biological Determinism and Social Responsibility. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1184-1194.
Added to index2011-07-12
Total downloads22 ( #76,407 of 1,098,400 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #33,041 of 1,098,400 )
How can I increase my downloads?