From moods to modules: Preliminary remarks for an evolutionary theory of mood phenomena
| Abstract | In the past few decades, research in the psychology of emotion has benefited greatly from being located in a firm evolutionary framework. It is argued that research in the psychology of mood might attain equal rigour by taking a similar approach. An evolutionary framework for mood research would be based on evolutionary psychology, the main thesis of which is the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. Translating the folk-psychological language of moods into the scientific language of modules might clarify many theoretical questions and provide a sound basis for empirical research. It is argued that such an evolutionary approach would reveal mood to be a much more heterogeneous category than emotion. While the six basic emotions identified by Paul Ekman are probably each subserved by a single module, prototypical moods such as elation, depression, anxiety and irritability are likely to be subserved by a wide range of modules. An evolutionary approach to mood might therefore lead to the elimination of the concept of mood from scientific psychology altogether. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Richard Samuels (1998). Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
Laura Sizer (2006). What Feelings Can't Do. Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity. Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
Craig Stephen Delancey (2006). Basic Moods. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
Carolyn S. Price (2006). Affect Without Object: Moods and Objectless Emotions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
Laura Sizer (2000). Towards a Computational Theory of Mood. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770.
M. Siemer (2009). Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods. Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.
Peter Totterdell (2004). Ideas Galore: Examining the Moods of a Modern Caveman. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):272-273.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads15 ( #78,732 of 549,500 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,500 )How can I increase my downloads? |

