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- D. A. Evans & P. T. Landsberg (1972). Free Will in a Mechanistic Universe? An Extension. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):336-343.
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Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will.
Discussion of D. A. Evans & P. T. Landsberg, Free will in a mechanistic universe? An extension
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