David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Thinking and Reasoning 4 (1):45 – 110 (1998)
The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of research and theorising on the problem in the subsequent 25 years. Theories of matching bias considered include those based on several broad frameworks including the heuristic-analytic theory, the mental models theory, the theory of optimal data selection, and relevance theory as well as the specific processing-negations account. The ability of these theories to account for a range of phenomena is considered, including the effects of linguistic form, realistic content, and explicit negation on the matching bias effect. Of particular importance are recent findings showing that the bias is observable on a wider range of linguistic forms than has generally been thought, and that it is almost entirely dependent on the use of implicit negation in the logical cases to which rules are applied. The reasons for the general suppression of matching when realistic content is used are, however, unclear and a need for further research is identified here. It is concluded that matching bias is a highly robust effect which is closely connected with the problem of understanding implicit negation. Most of the theories in the literature are unable to account for at least some of the major phenomena discovered in research on the bias. The accounts that fare best are those that posit local effects of negation, including the heuristic-analytic and processing negations theories.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2012). Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions. Erkenntnis 76 (3):373-394.
Hugo Mercier (2012). Looking for Arguments. Argumentation 26 (3):305-324.
Jonathan StB. T. Evans (2003). In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.
Similar books and articles
Donna Torrens (1999). Individual Differences and the Belief Bias Effect: Mental Models, Logical Necessity, and Abstract Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (1):1 – 28.
Christoph Stahl, Karl Christoph Klauer & Edgar Erdfelder (2008). Matching Bias in the Selection Task is Not Eliminated by Explicit Negations. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):281 – 303.
Edgar Erdfelder, Karl Christoph Klauer & Christoph Stahl (2008). Matching Bias in the Selection Task is Not Eliminated by Explicit Negations. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):281-303.
Hiroshi Yama (2001). Matching Versus Optimal Data Selection in the Wason Selection Task. Thinking and Reasoning 7 (3):295 – 311.
Mike Oaksford (2002). Contrast Classes and Matching Bias as Explanations of the Effects of Negation on Conditional Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (2):135 – 151.
Sylvain Moutier, Nathalie Angeard & Olivier Houde (2002). Deductive Reasoning and Matching-Bias Inhibition Training: Evidence From a Debiasing Paradigm. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (3):205 – 224.
Hiroshi Yama (2002). Context, Goal, Utility, and Relevance: A Reply to Evans (2002) Considering Oaksford (2002). Thinking and Reasoning 8 (3):225 – 230.
Jérôme Prado & Ira A. Noveck (2006). How Reaction Time Measures Elucidate the Matching Bias and the Way Negations Are Processed. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):309 – 328.
Walter J. Schroyens, Walter Schaeken & G. (2001). The Processing of Negations in Conditional Reasoning: A Meta-Analytic Case Study in Mental Model and/or Mental Logic Theory. Thinking and Reasoning 7 (2):121 – 172.
Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2002). Matching Bias and Set Sizes: A Discussion of Yama (2001). Thinking and Reasoning 8 (2):153 – 163.
Added to index2009-02-08
Total downloads36 ( #50,796 of 1,099,788 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #66,740 of 1,099,788 )
How can I increase my downloads?