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On statistical intuitions and inferential rules: A discussion of Kahneman and Tversky
Cognition 12 (3):319-323 (1982)
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References found in this work
On the psychology of prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Reasoning.Peter C. Wason - 1966 - In B. Foss (ed.), New Horizons in Psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. pp. 135-151.
On the relation between the natural logic of reasoning and standard logic.Martin D. Braine - 1978 - Psychological Review 85 (1):1-21.
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