David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):321 – 339 (2007)
In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic process will control the response. The parallel-competitive model assumes that each system operates in parallel to deliver a putative response, resulting sometimes in conflict that then needs to be resolved. Finally, the default-interventionist model involves the cueing of default responses by the heuristic system that may or may not be altered by subsequent intervention of the analytic system. A second, independent issue also emerges from this discussion. The superior performance of higher-ability participants on reasoning tasks may be due to the fact that they engage in more analytic reasoning ( quantity hypothesis ) or alternatively to the fact that the analytic reasoning they apply is more effective ( quality hypothesis ).
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Citations of this work BETA
Eugen Fischer (2014). Philosophical Intuitions , Heuristics , and Metaphors. Synthese 191 (3):569-606.
Wim De Neys & Jean-François Bonnefon (2013). The 'Whys' and 'Whens' of Individual Differences in Thinking Biases. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):172-178.
Wim De Neys & Samuel Franssens (2009). Belief Inhibition During Thinking: Not Always Winning but at Least Taking Part. Cognition 113 (1):45-61.
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