Synthese 123 (2):263-278 (2000)
|Abstract||I provide an intuitive, semantic account of a new logic forcomparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both aclassical truth-value and a ``how much'''' value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determinedby the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value ofeach atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separatestandard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari''s comparative logics, in that it does not allow for the formation of comparative statements out of truth-functional molecules. I argue that CL provides a betteranalysis of comparisons and predicate vagueness than classicallogic, fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory. CL provides a modelfor descriptions of the world in terms of comparisons only. Thesorites paradox can be solved by the elimination of atomic sentences.|
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