Humean agent-neutral reasons?

Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67 (2009)
In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons
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DOI 10.1080/13869790802635614
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Finlay (2008). The Error in the Error Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.

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Citations of this work BETA
Daan Evers (2013). In Defence of Proportionalism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):313-320.
Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons and Promotion. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):98-122.
Eden Lin (2016). Simple Probabilistic Promotion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).

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