David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80 (2007)
There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then note that some of the sort of data invoked by the abstract object theorist in fact cuts against her position. I concludle that we should not regard fictional characters as abstract objects but rather should adopt a make-believe theoretic account of fictional characters along the lines of those developed by Ken Walton and others.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
Amie L. Thomasson (1999). Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2000). On Quantifier Domain Restriction. Mind and Language 15 (2&3):219--61.
Nathan Salmon (1998). Nonexistence. Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
Terence Parsons (1980). Nonexistent Objects. Yale University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott (2010). Recovering What Is Said With Empty Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):239-273.
David C. Spewak Jr (2016). A Modulation Account of Negative Existentials. Philosophia 44 (1):227-245.
Alberto Voltolini (2009). The Seven Consequences of Creationism. Metaphysica 10 (1):27-48.
Manuel García-Carpintero (2009). Voltolini's Ficta. Dialectica 63 (1):57-66.
Alberto Voltolini (2009). How Ficta Follow Fiction: Replies to Commentators. Dialectica 63 (1):75-84.
Similar books and articles
Sarah Sawyer (2002). Abstract Artifacts in Pretence. Philosophical Papers 31 (2):183-198.
Ross P. Cameron (2013). How to Be a Nominalist and a Fictional Realist. In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press 179.
Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146.
Gabriele Contessa (2010). Scientific Models and Fictional Objects. Synthese 172 (2):215 - 229.
Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Fictional Characters and Literary Practices. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):138-157.
Stuart Brock (2010). The Creationist Fiction: The Case Against Creationism About Fictional Characters. Philosophical Review 119 (3):337-364.
Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Speaking of Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads185 ( #18,298 of 1,902,212 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #41,851 of 1,902,212 )
How can I increase my downloads?