Qualia and vagueness

Synthese 106 (2):205-226 (1996)
In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia
Keywords Experience  Logic  Qualia  Universalism  Vagueness  Evans, G
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413700
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.

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