David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 106 (2):205-226 (1996)
In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia
|Keywords||Experience Logic Qualia Universalism Vagueness Evans, G|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Stephen Cole Kleene (1952). Introduction to Metamathematics. North Holland.
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
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