David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347 (2000)
In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
Thomas W. Smythe (1989). Disembodied Minds and Personal Identity. Philosophy Research Archives 14:415-423.
Michael Tye (1983). On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):275-282.
David A. Spieler (1974). Central State Materialism, Dualism, and Disembodied Existence. Personalist 55 (4):354-355.
E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
D. Pecnjak (1995). Remarks on Disembodied Existence. Acta Analytica 10 (13):209-13.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008). Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
Penelope Mackie (2011). Property Dualism and Substance Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
M. Pakaluk (2003). Degrees of Separation in the "Phaedo". Phronesis 48 (2):89 - 115.
Jason T. Eberl (2010). Varieties of Dualism. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads12 ( #189,864 of 1,699,739 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #161,079 of 1,699,739 )
How can I increase my downloads?