Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24 (1):67 – 76 (1999)
|Abstract||A common concern with respect to cloning is based on the belief that cloning produces identical individuals. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of what type of identity-relation cloning involves. The concept "identity" is ambiguous, and the statement that cloning produces "identical" individuals is not meaningful unless the notion of identity is clarified. This paper distinguishes between numerical and qualitative; relational and intrinsic; logical and empirical identity, and discusses the empirical individuation of clones in terms of genetics, physiology, perception, cognition and personality. I argue that the only relation of identity cloning involves is qualitative, intrinsic and empirical: genetic indiscernibility , unlikely to include identity under other aspects mentioned. A popular argument against cloning claims our "right" to a "unique identity". This objection either implies (absurdly) the right not to be an identical twin, or assumes (incorrectly) that cloning involves identity other than genetic. Either way, the argument is untenable.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Helga Kuhse (2001). Should Cloning Be Banned for the Sake of the Child? Poiesis and Praxis 1 (1):17-33.
Timothy Mosteller (2005). Aristotle and Headless Clones. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (4):339-350.
Richard Dawkins (1997). Thoughts on Cloning Humans. London Evening Standard.
Matteo Galletti (2006). Begetting, Cloning and Being Human: Two National Commission Reports Against Human Cloning From Italy and the U.S.A. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 18 (2):156-171.
Robert Lane (2006). Safety, Identity and Consent: A Limited Defense of Reproductive Human Cloning. Bioethics 20 (3):125–135.
Joyce C. Havstad (2010). Human Reproductive Cloning: A Conflict of Liberties. Bioethics 24 (2):71-77.
Nicholas Agar (2003). Cloning and Identity. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):9 – 26.
F. M. Kamm (2005). Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.
Richard Greene (2004). Does the Non-Identity Problem Block a Class of Arguments Against Cloning? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1):95-101.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #131,640 of 722,708 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,708 )
How can I increase my downloads?