Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 118 (2):201-227 (1999)
|Abstract||I argue that it is rational for a person to believe the conjunction of her beliefs. This involves responding to the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes. In addition, I suggest that in normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction just is to believe its conjuncts.|
|Keywords||Lottery Preface Conjunction Belief|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief. Erkenntnis 71 (1):35 - 51.
Heikki Saari (2001). On Believing in Witches. Philosophical Papers 30 (3):307-318.
E. J. Coffman (2013). Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief. Res Philosophica 90 (2):147-160.
Michael Bergmann (2009). Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure. Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
Joel Pust (2004). On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity. Dialectica 58 (1):71–87.
Christoph Michel & Albert Newen (2010). Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Curtis Brown (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Damian Cox & Michael Levine (2004). Believing Badly. Philosophical Papers 33 (3):309-328.
Richard H. Feldman (1988). Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #31,717 of 723,483 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 723,483 )
How can I increase my downloads?