Philosophy Compass 3 (4):664-684 (2008)
|Abstract||I survey a number of views about how we can obtain knowledge of modal propositions, propositions about necessity and possibility. One major approach is that whether a proposition or state of affairs is conceivable tells us something about whether it is possible. I examine two quite different positions that fall under this rubric, those of Yablo and Chalmers. One problem for this approach is the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and I deal with some of the ways in which these authors respond to the problem, including the use of two-dimensional modal semantics. Conventionalism about modality offers a complementary approach to modal epistemology, prompting us to identify our knowledge of modal truths with our mastery of linguistic or conceptual conventions. Finally, I discuss an approach to modal epistemology deriving from David Lewis's work that seeks to identify structural features of the modal space over which necessity and possibility are defined.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan (2009). Consciousness and Modal Empiricism. Philosophia 37 (2).
M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2012). On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo. Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):147-164.
Bob Hale (2002). Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1–20.
C. Peacocke (1997). Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth and Epistemology. Mind 106 (423):521-574.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility. Erkenntnis 67 (3):387 - 399.
Peter Van Inwagen (1998). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 92:67--84.
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Biggs (2011). Abduction and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads129 ( #3,732 of 556,888 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #7,578 of 556,888 )
How can I increase my downloads?