David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 67 (1):91 - 110 (2007)
This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons.
|Keywords||van Fraassen Reflection Belief|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
David Christensen (1991). Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs. Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
David Phiroze Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Simon J. Evnine (2005). Containing Multitudes: Reflection, Expertise and Persons as Groups. Episteme 2 (1):57-64.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephanie Beardman (2013). A Non-Factualist Defense of the Reflection Principle. Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.
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Bas C. van Fraassen (1995). Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens. Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.
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Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
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