David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 110 (438):335-367 (2001)
I argue for the thesis (UL) that there are certain logical abilities that any rational creature must have. Opposition to UL comes from naturalized epistemologists who hold that it is a purely empirical question which logical abilities a rational creature has. I provide arguments that any creatures meeting certain conditions—plausible necessary conditions on rationality—must have certain specific logical concepts and be able to use them in certain specific ways. For example, I argue that any creature able to grasp theories must have a concept of conjunction subject to the usual introduction and elimination rules. I also deal with disjunction, conditionality and negation. Finally, I put UL to work in showing how it could be used to define a notion of logical obviousness that would be well suited to certain contexts—e.g. radical translation and epistemic logic—in which a concept of obviousness is often invoked.
|Keywords||Logical concepts Logical abilities Cherniak Rationality|
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Citations of this work BETA
Julian Fink (2014). A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'. Erkenntnis (4):1-33.
Jonathan Adler (2007). Argumentation and Distortion. Episteme 4 (3):382-401.
Laurence Goldstein (2002). The Indefinability of “One”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):29 - 42.
Michael J. Shaffer (2004). Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.
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