David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
I argue for the thesis (UL) that there are certain logical abilities that any rational creature must have. Opposition to UL comes from naturalized epistemologists who hold that it is a purely empirical question which logical abilities a rational creature has. I provide arguments that any creatures meeting certain conditions - plausible necessary conditions on rationality - must have certain specific logical concepts and be able to use them in certain specific ways. For example, I argue that any creature able to grasp theories must have a concept of conjunction subject to the usual introduction and elimination rules. I also deal with disjunction, conditionality and negation. These cases are not intended to be exhaustive of universal logical abilities. Finally, I put UL to work in showing how it could be used to define a notion of logical obviousness that would be well suited to certain contexts - e.g. radical translation and epistemic logic - in which a concept of obviousness is often invoked.
|Keywords||Inference Logic Cherniak Logical ability Logical concepts|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Owen Anderson (2008). The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology. Sophia 47 (2):201-222.
Dieter Lohmar (2002). Elements of a Phenomenological Justification of Logical Principles, Including an Appendix with Mathematical Doubts Concerning Some Proofs of Cantor on the Transfiniteness of the Set of Real Numbers. Philosophia Mathematica 10 (2):227-250.
Carroll Guen Hart (1993). "Power in the Service of Love": John Dewey's Logic and the Dream of a Common Language. Hypatia 8 (2):190 - 214.
Ann Whittle (2010). Dispositional Abilities. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (12).
Manuel Bremer (2008). Transcendental Logic Redefined. Review of Contemporary Philosophy 7.
Theresa Waynand Tobin (2005). The Non-Modularity of Moral Knowledge. Social Philosophy Today 21:33-50.
Darius Koriako (2003). Ist Die Linguistische Theorie Des Logischen Apriori Obsolet? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (1):43-68.
Roy Sorensen (2004). Charity Implies Meta-Charity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):290 - 315.
Ioannis Trisokkas (2009). The Speculative Logical Theory of Universality. The Owl of Minerva 40 (2009):141-172.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #42,332 of 1,100,913 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #290,699 of 1,100,913 )
How can I increase my downloads?