Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23 (2003)
| Abstract | Byrne & Hilbert defend color realism, which assumes that: (a) colors are properties of objects; (b) these objects are physical; hence, (c) colors are physical properties. I accept (a), agree that in a certain sense (b) can be defended, but reject (c). Colors are properties of perceptual objects – which also have underlying physical properties – but they are not physical properties. | |||||||||
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