Journal of Philosophical Research 19:263-271 (1994)
|Abstract||The work of W.V.O. Quine is often held to folIow the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle in broad outline, but to diverge from it in crucial particulars. On the basis of recent reevaluations of the latter, I argue that the philosophical distance between Quine and the Vienna Circle is less than ordinarily thought, or, most importantly, than Quine himself admits|
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