David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831 (2012)
Philosophical debates about collective scientific knowledge concern two distinct theses: groups are necessary to produce scientific knowledge, and groups have scientific knowledge in their own right. Thesis has strong support. Groups are required, in many cases of scientific inquiry, to satisfy methodological norms, to develop theoretical concepts, or to validate the results of inquiry as scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge‐production is collective in at least three respects. However, support for is more equivocal. Though some examples suggest that groups have scientific knowledge independently of their individual members, these cases are also explained in terms of relational complexes of members’ beliefs
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John Beatty (2006). Masking Disagreement Among Experts. Episteme 3 (1-2):52-67.
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Citations of this work BETA
Maureen A. O'Malley (2014). Exemplary Philosophy of Science: How to Do It. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 45 (1):149-152.
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