The epistemic value of good sense

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PhilPapers Archive Abrol Fairweather, The epistemic value of good sense
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick Firth (1981). ``Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental&Quot. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.
John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.

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